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CONFRONTATION
wholly unfit for the supervision of evidentiary
rules. He observed that neither the clause itself,
nor the historical understanding of it, offers solid
guidance for adjudicating the appropriateness of
rules of evidence. 40 His alternative, in light of the
plurality's failure to articulate a standard for
applying the confrontation clause, was to abandon
it altogether in favor of testing federal-state rules
of evidence under due process of law. Harlan con-
cluded that the defendant had not been denied
the fair trial that due process guarantees, yet he
offered as prime support for this finding the fact
that the declarant's incriminating statement was
made against the conspiracy's interest, 4' hence
demonstrating a degree of trustworthiness. Har-
viewed the confrontation clause as requiring the pro-
duction of available witnesses when reasonably possible.
In Dutton, however, he perceived that this standard
"would significantly curtail development of the law of
evidence" and invalidate such justifiable and valuable
hearsay exceptions as the business records exception.
Indeed,"[i]f the hearsay exception involved in a given
case is such as to commend itself to reasonable men,
production of the declarant is likely to be difficult,
unavailing, or pointless." 400 U.S. at 96.
40 Id. at 95.
41 Accomplishment of the main object of a con-
spiracy will seldom terminate the community
of interest of the conspirators. Declarations
against that interest evince some likelihood of
Ian's employment of the due process standard2
thus relies on indicia of reliability, as did the
plurality's confrontation standard, and reaches
the same result. Any improvement over the lack
of a definite standard in the plurality's approach
is not evident.
The Supreme Court in Dutton v. Evans reached
beyond principles espoused in previous decisions
to uphold a nontraditional hearsay exception under
the sixth amendment confrontation standard. Al-
though the Court declined to equate the confron-
tation clause with the hearsay rule, its holding
relies on traditional justifications for hearsay ex-
ceptions. This facial inconsistency reflects the lack
of meaning in merely equating or not equating
the two doctrines. Though Dutton relaxed the
requirements needed to satisfy confrontation, 4 its
importance is undercut by the Court's failure to
provide a basis for future decision.
trustworthiness. The jury, with the guidance
of defense counsel, should be alert to the obvious
dangers of crediting such testimony.
Id. at 99.
12Justice Marshall refused to adopt Justice Harlan's
due process approach in part because it "concededly
[had] nothing to do with the Confrontation Clause."
Id. at 110 n. 11.
41 See note 26 supra.
OBSCENITY
Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971)
United States v. 37 Photos, 402 U.S. 363 (1971)
United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971)
Last term the United States Supreme Court, in
three cases dealing with obscenity, struck down
administrative censorship of the mail, upheld
administrative censorship in border searches, and
upheld criminal sanctions for using the mail to
distribute obscene materials. In Blount v. Rizzi,
two federal statutes were claimed to be uncon-
stitutional violations of first amendment free
speech.2 The Postmaster General instituted ad-
ministrative proceedings against Tony Rizzi
under 39 U.S.C. § 4006,3 and upon the decision
1400 U.S. 410 (1971).
1 United States Constitution amendment I: "Con-
gress shall make no law ... abridging freedom of
speech, or of the press."
3 39 U.S.C. § 4006 (1964) authorized the Postmaster
General to return mail to the sender or forbid payment
of postal money orders for the sale of materials which
that certain magazines sold by Rizzi were obscene,
an order to return mail and forbid payment was
entered sixty-one days later on the basis of 39
U.S.C. § 4007. 4 On appeal to the district court,
§ 4006 was found to violate first amendment free
speech and fifth amendment due process. 5 In
United States v. The Book Bin6 the district court
were determined obscene by administrative proceedings
which he initiated.
4 39 U.S.C. § 4007 (1964) authorized the Postmaster
General to obtain a temporary restraining order and a
preliminary injunction from a United States district
court directing detention of the seller's incoming mail
pending the administrative proceedings under § 4006,
merely on a showing of probable cause that a violation
of § 4006 had occurred.
6 Rizzi v. Blount, 305 F. Supp. 634, 635 (C.D. Cal.
1970).
6306 F. Supp. 1023 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
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found both § 4006 and § 4007 unconstitutional on
the same grounds.7 The two cases were joined on
appeal to the Supreme Court.
In a unanimous opinion written by Mr. Justice
Brennan, the Supreme Court affirmed the finding
of unconstitutionality. It held that the statutes
failed to provide adequate procedural safeguards,
as required by Fieedinan v. Maryland,s against
restraining constitutionally protected speech from
the mails.9
United States v. Thirty-seven (37) Photographs"
upheld the constitutionality of 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a),
which authorizes the administrative seizure of
allegedly obscene materials and a determination of
their obscenity during a border search. Thirty-
seven photographs belonging to Milton Luros
were seized when he attempted to bring them into
the country for publication in The Kama Sutra of
Vatsyayana, a -book describing various positions
for sexual intercourse." Without deciding whether
the photographs were obscene, 2 the district court
found that the statute did not meet the procedural
requirements of Freedman v. Maryland and violated
the right to possess obscenity privately guaranteed
by Stanley v. Georgia'3
The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by
Mr. Justice White, reversed the decision of the
district court 6-3. In Part I of the opinion, the
Court acknowledged that § 1305(a) failed to
satisfy the Freedman procedural requirements
because it lacked a specific time limit between the
seizure of the materials and a judicial determina-
tion of their obscenity 4 Nevertheless, the statute
was upheld. The Court reviewed various instances
of reasonable prior restraint and then wrote a time
limit into the statute to correct its procedural
inadequacy-forfeiture proceedings within four-
teen days of seizure and a judicial determination
7 Id. at 1028.
8 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
400 U.S. at 417, 418.
1 402 U.S. 363 (1971).
" Id. at 365-366.
"2The Supreme Court did not determine the ob-
scenity vel non of the materials in any of the three cases
discussed in this note. Some Justices, particularly
Mr. Justice Harlan, have suggested that this issue-
the obscenity of the material in each case-is of con-
stitutional dimension. See, e.g., Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 496 (1957) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
See also, Engdahl, Requiem for Roth: Obscenity Doctrine
Is Changing, 68 MIcH. L. REV. 185 (1969). But see
Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 476 (1966)
(Black, J., dissenting).
" 394 U.S. 557 (1969). See United States v. Thirty-
seven (37) Photographs, 309 F. Supp. 36 (C.D. Cal.
1970).
1 402 U.S. at 368.
within sixty days of the initiation of proceedings."
In Part II of Justice White's decision, in which
only the Chief Justice and Justices Brennan and
Blackmun concurred, Mr. Justice White rejected
the argument that the Stanley v. Georgia right of
privacy applied in a border search.' 6
In United States v. Reidel'7 the appellee was
indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1461" for knowingly
using the mails to deliver obscene matter, a booklet
entitled The True Facts About Imported Pornogra-
phy. 9 Reidel contended that he had mailed the
booklet only to consenting adults. He also con-
tended that the statute as applied to him was
unconstitutional, since it prevented his delivery
of obscene materials to consenting adults, who
may, according to Stanley, constitutionally view
such material privately." Reidel argued that the
right of privacy guaranteed by Stanley included
the constitutional right to receive obscene material
if one so desired, and thus a distributor had the
right to send it. In an unreported opinion, the
district court, assuming arguendo that the booklets
were obscene, held that § 1461 was unconstitu-
tional as applied to Reidel, since the statute
violated the Stanley right of privacy."
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court
decision 7-2. The Court reiterated its previous
holding that Stanley did not affect the decision in
Roth v. United States22 that obscenity was not
speech protected by the first amendment 2 3 Since
Stanley dealt solely with obscenity in private
hands, its protection did not apply to commercial
distribution of obscene materials through the
mail.
24
The Supreme Court first met the obscenity
issue squarely25 in Roth v. United States, holding
11 Id. at 373-74.
18 Id. at 376. Harlan, J., concurred in the judgment
and in Part I of the opinion. Stewart, J., concurred in
the judgment and in Part I of the opinion. Black,
Douglas, and Marshall, JJ., dissented.
17 402 U.S. 351 (1971).
18 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1964) provides that anyone who
knowingly uses the mails for delivery of any obscene
matter or any matter advertising or dealing with
abortion or contraception shall be fined not more than
$5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both,
for the first offense and shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both,
for each subsequent offense.
" 402 U.S. at 353.
2Id.
21 Id.
2 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
"402 U.S. at 354.
2Id. at 355.
2- Prior to Roth the Court had decided the obscenity
vel non of particular materials or conduct, but it had
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that obscenity is not constitutionally protected
speech. 26 Subsequent cases defined obscenity27 and
established additional factors to be considered in a
determination of wnfether specific matter was
obscene.28 Among these were Freedman v. Mary-
never reached the broader issue of the status of ob-
scenity as a class of speech, i.e., whether it came under
the protection of the first amendment. In Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), the Court
held the expression "son of a bitch" to be obscene.
[T]here are certain well-defined and narrowly
limited classes of speech, the prevention and pun-
ishment of which have never been thought to
raise any constitutional problem. These include
the lewd and obscene.... It has been well ob-
served that such utterances are no essential part
of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight
social value as a step to truth that any benefit
that may be derived from them is clearly out-
weighed by the social interest in order and mo-
rality.
Id. at 571, 572.
In Doubleday & Co. v. New York, 335 U.S. 848
(1948), the Court affirmed without opinion a lower
court determination that Edmund Wilson's Memoirs of
Hecate County was obscene. The decision was four to
four with Mr. Justice Frankfurter, a personal friend
of Wilson's, not sitting.
In Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1956), the
Court ruled a state statute protecting children from
obscenity unconstitutionally overbroad in its applica-
tion to the entire adult public.
See generally Kalven, The Metaphysics of The Law
of Obscenity, 1960 Su'. CT. R v. 1; Lockhart & Mc-
Clure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Consti-
tutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REv. 5 (1960); Lock-
hart & McClure, Literature, The Law of Obscenity, and
the Constitution, 38 MANN. L. REv. 295 (1954).
26354 U.S. at 485. Cf. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343
U.S. 250 (1952) (criminal libel unprotected by first
amendment); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494
(1951) (balancing state security against free speech);
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (clear
and present danger test).
Professor Kalven discussed the limits which New
York Times, Inc. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964),
placed on Beauharnais' absolute holding, and correctly
forecast that Roth would be similarly limited, as it
later was by Stanley v. Georgia. See Kalven, The New
York Times Case: A Note On "The Central Meaning of
The First Amendment," 1964 Sup. Cr. REv. 191. But
see Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meikldejohn
Interpretation of The First Amendment, 79 HAnv. L.
R Ev. 1, 10 (1965) (Radical shifts in judicial doctrine
are rare). See generally Engdahl, supra note 12; Laugh-
lin, A Requiem For Requiems: The Supreme Court At
The Bar of Reality, 68 MicH. L. REv. 1389 (1970).
2 See, e.g., Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413
(1966); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964). The
criteria for determining whether certain material was
obscene set by Roth included: 1) appeal to prurient
interest in sex; 2) patently offensive to contemporary
community standards; 3) utterly without redeeming
social importance. 354 U.S. at 484, 485, 487.
2 Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966),
established that the method of distributing materials,
pandering to the buyer's prurient interest, may be
evidence contributing to a determination that the
material is obscene. Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S.
767 (1967) held that the sale of books and magazines
land,29 which established procedural requirements
for administrative censorship, and Stanley v.
Georgia," which carved out a substantive exception
to Rot/h tor obscenity possessed in one's homf.
In Freedman, the Supreme Court unanimously
struck down a state statute" which required the
submission of motion pictures to a board of censors
for prior approval before public showing. The
petitioner, convicted of violating the statute,
challenged its constitutionality. The Court held
that the Maryland statute violated first amend-
ment freedom of speech since it lacked the proce-
dural safeguards necessary to prevent censorship
of protected speech.3 The Court required the
following safeguards for prior administrative
restraint: 3 the burden of initiating judicial review
and proving the unprotected nature of the material
rests on the censor; to prevent the censor's decision
from achieving finality, there must be prompt
judicial review; the statute must limit the time
was protected by the first amendment where (1) the
materials were not obscene under the three-pronged
test of Roth, and (2) it was not contended that the
material reached juveniles or unwilling adults, or was
sold by means of pandering. Ginsberg v. New York,
390 U.S. 629 (1968) recognized a valid state interest in
protecting minors from obscene materials.
29380 U.S. 51 (1965).
30 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
31 MD. ANN. CODE art. 66A, § 2 (1957):
It shall be unlawful to sell, lease, lend, exhibit, or
use any motion picture film or view in the State
of Maryland unless the said film or view has been
submitted by the exchange, owner, or lessee, of
the film or view and duly approved and licensed
by the Maryland State Board of Censors ...
2 380 U.S. at 61. The Supreme Court has dealt with
many similar cases of prior administrative -restraint.
See, e.g., Teitel Film Corp. v. Cusack, 390 U.S. 139
(1968) (striking down city motion picture censorship
ordinance); A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S.
205 (1964); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S.
58 (1963); Manual Enterprises v. Day, 370 U.S. 478
(1962); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961);
Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957)
(cited by the Court as a model statute of constitutional
prior restraint); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343
U.S. 495 (1952); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697
(1931).
1 380 U.S. at 58-60.
The teaching of our cases is that, because only
a judicial determination in an adversary pro-
ceeding ensures necessary sensitivity to freedom
of expression, only a procedure requiring a judicial
determination suffices to impose a valid final re-
straint.
Id. at 58. See Monaghan, First Amendment "Due
Process", 83 HAnv. L. REv. 518 (1970); Note, Prior
Adversary Hearings On The Question of Obscenity, 70
CoLum. L. Rv. 1403 (1970); Note, The Requirement
and Techniques for Holding an Adversary Hearing Prior




between restraint and judicial determination to
the shortest possible fixed period.
In Stanley v. Georgia, the Supreme Court re-
versed the defendant's conviction for possession
of obscene material, holding that the first and
fourteenth amendments prohibit making mere
private possession of obscene material a crime.
Although the decision in Stanley did not limit
Roth's holding that obscenity is unprotected
speech,'3 4 the Court's recognition of the right to
possess obscene materials in one's home without
reprisal in effect created an exception to Roth.3 5
Stanley did not say whether there is a first amend-
ment right to receive the obscene material, or
whether there is a constitutional right to distribute
such materials to consenting adults.36
In Blount v. Rizzi, the Supreme Court held that
39 U.S.C. § 4006 failed to meet the procedural
safeguards announced in Friedman. The Post-
master General was not required to seek a prompt
judicial determination of the obscenity of the
magazines before banning them from the mail, nor
was there any assurance of prompt judicial review
of the administrative proceedings. 7 In addition,
the Court found that the requirement of mere
probable cause to believe that § 4006 had been
violated was constitutionally insufficient to sup-
port a mail detention order under § 4007, so there
was a violation of due process."
In Thirty-seven Photographs, however, although
the district court had held that 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a)
violated both free speech and due process, 9 the
Supreme Court upheld the statute's validity by
judicially imposing fourteen-day and sixty-day
It394 U.S. at 568.
'5The decision in Stanley was based on the first
amendment (privacy and freedom of thought), rather
than the fourth amendment. 394 U.S. at 565. Cf.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama,
357 U.S. 449 (1958); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616 (1886).6Karalexis v. Byrne, 306 F. Supp. 1363 (D. Mass.
1969) extended Stanley v. Georgia to give first amend-
ment protection to commercial distribution of certain
admittedly obscene material, specifically the film "I
Am Curious (Yellow)." See Katz, Privacy and Pornog-
raphy: Stanley v. Georgia, 1969 Sup. CT. REv. 203;
Comment, Karalexis v. Byrne And The Regulation of
Obscenity: "I Am Curious (Stanley)," 56 VA. L. REv.
1205 (1970); Note, First Amendment: The New Meta-
physics of The Law of Obscenity, 57 CAm. L. Rzv.
1257 (1969): Note, Prior Adversary Hearings On The
Question Of Obscenity, 70 CoLnrt. L. REv. 1403 (1970);
Note, Stanley v. Georgia: A First Amendment Approach
To Obscenity Control, 31 OHio ST. L.J. 364 (1970).
31400 U.S. at 420-21.
3 Id.
11309 F. Supp. at 38.
time limits on the administrative restraint. Justice
White distinguished Thirty-seven Photographs from
Freedman, where a state statute was at issue which
he claimed the Court had no authority to rewrite,
and Blount v. Rizzi, where the statute had so many
infirmities that a complete revision would have
been required.40 Mr. Justice Black, dissenting,
believed that the statute in Thirty-seven Photo-
graphs should have been struck down. He criticized
the Court's rewriting of the statute as judicial
legislation, and found its action inconsistent with
its exercise of judicial restraint in Freedman and
Blount v. Rizzi.41 Moreover, the two Justices
differed in their interpretations of the legislative
intent behind each of the two federal statutes.4
With respect to the lower court determination
that § 1305 (a) violated the Supreme Court's
decision in Stanley v. Georgia by proscribing the
importation of obscene matter for private use,
Part II of Justice White's plurality decision held
that Stanley did not apply to border searches.4
White viewed the distinction between importation
for commercial purposes or private use as irrelevant
to the case at hand, since Luros' importation was
for commercial purposes. He upheld the power of
Congress to forbid the importation of obscene
material for any purpose.A Only four justices,
40 The obstacle in Freedman and Teitel was that
the statutes were enacted pursuant to state
rather than federal authority ... and we lack
jurisdiction authoritatively to construe state
legislation. [Citation omitted] In Blount, we
were dealing with a federal statute and thus had
power to give it an authoritative construction;
salvation of that statute, however, would have
required its complete rewriting in a manner
inconsistent with the expressed intentions of
some of its authors. For the statute at issue in
Blount not only failed to specify time limits
within which judicial proceedings must be in-
stituted and completed; it also failed to give
any authorization at all to the administrative
agency, upon a determination that material
was obscene to seek judicial review.
402 U.S. at 369-0.
41 Id. at 383-87.
2 Mr. Justice White argued that the legislative
intent of 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) was for an immediate
judicial hearing. He further argued that at the time of
the enactment of 39 U.S.C. §§ 4006-07, the Postmaster
General desired only an administrative determination
of obscenity. 402 U.S. at 370-71.
Mr. Justice Black noted that the word "immedi-
ately" was struck from a proposed amendment, and
was not part of § 1305 (a). Black denied that the isolated
statement of the Postmaster General constituted the
legislative intent behind § 4006 and § 4007. He would
therefore have reversed both cases. Id. at 384--86.
See generally 72 CoNG. REc. 5420-5424 (1930).
4402 U.S. at 376.
4 That the private user under Stanley may not
be prosecuted for possession of obscenity in his
19711
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however, Chief Justice Burger and Justices Bren-
nan, White, and Blackmun, concurring in Part II
of White's opinion, would define the Congressional
power to authorize administrative censorship in a
border search in cases of importation for private
use. Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring in the judg-
ment and Part I of the opinion, denied that Luros
had standing to raise the overbreadth argument
based upon the Stanley right of privacy,45 and
would reserve the issue until such a case arose.
Justice Stewart, concurring in the judgment and
Part I of the opinion,46 and Justice Marshall,
dissenting, would seem to allow the importation
of obscene material by individuals for their own
use. Justices Black and Douglas, dissenting, would
allow an absolute privilege under the first amend-
ment to import obscene material for any purpose.47
In Reidel, although the appellee argued that he
mailed obscene materials only to consenting adults,
the Court nevertheless affirmed his conviction.
The seven-member majority did not address
Reidel's claim, but reversed the decision of the
district court solely on the basis that Stanley's
protection of the right to view obscenity privately
did not apply to obscenity otherwise unprotected
under the first amendment and sent commercially
through the mail. Even Justice Marshall, who
dissented in Thirty-seven Photographs, concurred in
the judgment against Reidel. While he favored
the right to import obscenity for private use, he
agreed with the majority in Reidel that to send
obscene material through the mail is, ipso facto,
commercial distribution, and may constitutionally
be prevented.9 Only Justice Black, dissenting and
joined by Justice Douglas, argued that to refuse
willing adults the right to receive obscene materials
effectively scuttles their right to view them pri-
vately, as guaranteed by Stanley.4
home does not mean that he is entitled to import
it from abroad free from the power of Congress
to exclude noxious articles from commerce. Id.
45 Id. at 377-78.
"I would not in this case decide, even by way
of dicta, that the Government may lawfully
seize literary material intended for the purely
private use of the importer. The terms of the
statute appear to apply to an American tourist
who.., returns home with a single book in his
luggage, with no intention of selling it, or other-
wise using it, except to read it. If the Govern-
ment can constitutionally take the book away
from him as he passes through customs, then I
do not understand the meaning of Stanley v.
Georgia.
Id. at 379.47 Id.
18 Id. at 360-61.
41 Since the plurality opinion offers no plausible
Following the Roth decision, the Supreme Court
asserted a vigilance for first amendment safeguards
concerning prior restraint in Freedman and private
possession of obscenirty in Stanley. Blount v. Rizzi
followed Freedman's example by striking down
unlimited administrative censorship of the mail.
Thirty-seven Photographs, on the other hand,
upheld administrative censorship of the importa-
tion of obscenity for commercial distribution when
appropriate safeguards are employed, and Reidel
upheld criminal sanctions for sending obscenity
through the mail, regardless of the nature of its
intended use.
Regarding the issues raised by Stanley v. Georgia,
Thirty-seven Photographs and Reidel effectively end
speculation that the right to possess obscenity
privately somehow includes a right to distribute it
commercially, even to consenting adults. The only
question the Court did not answer was whether
Stanley protects the importation of obscenity for
private use.5 The Court is closely divided on the
issue, and may split five to four or six to three
either way, with Justice Harlan and Justice Black's
replacements casting the deciding votes. Justice
Harlan is the only member of the Thirty-seven
Photographs court who did not register his opinion
on importation for private use.51 The Supreme
Court, however, has recognized that Congressional
power in the area of border searches has few
limitations. It is possible that, given the Court's
broad language in Thirty-seven Photographs and
Reidel, the Court may create an exception to the
reason to distinguish private possession of ob-
scenity from importation for private use ... per-
haps in the future [Stanley] will be recognized
as good law only when a man writes salacious
books in his attic, prints them in his basement,
and reads them in his living room.
Id. at 382. See Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767
(1967); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381'U.S. 301
(1965); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1909).
"The Supreme Court has noted probable juris-
diction in a case which raises the issue of importation
of obscenity for private use. In United States v. Twelve
200-Foot Reels, prob. juris. noted, 403 U.S. 930 (1971),
the district court held 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) to violate
the first and fifth amendments. See 9 BNA CRmt. L.
RzTR. 4073.
51 Chief justice Burger and Justices Brennan and
Blackmun joined Part II of Justice White's opinion
in Thirty-seven Photographs, where he denied that
Stanley protected private importation of obscenity.
402 U.S. at 376. Justice Stewart showed reluctance to
so interpret Stanley, though he concurred in the judg-
ment. Id. at 379. Justice Marshall felt the same, and
dissented. Id. at 361. Justices Black and Douglas also
dissented. Id. at 381-82. Justice Harlan reserved
comment on private importation. Id. at 378; cf. United
States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. at 357 (concurring opinion
of Harlan, J.).
[Vol. 62
